Meeting California's 2020 greenhouse gas emissions target will require an average CO2 emissions reduction of approximately 380 lbs per month per person in the U.S. For the typical two-person household, 760 lbs per month can be saved by employing such near-term measures as reducing monthly miles traveled (by auto and aircraft) and altering behaviors related to appliance energy consumption (e.g., employing a smart thermostat, reducing water heater temperature settings, and eliminating phantom loads). Additional long-term savings can be obtained by purchasing more fuel efficient vehicles, reducing home floor area, moving into multi-family housing units with shared walls, and replacing old appliances with energy efficient products. To get a sense of where these strategies exist for individuals and households, this paper quantifies greenhouse gas reductions from these and other household decisions. Upstream and downstream emissions-reductions policies are discussed, including taxation, cap and trade among energy producers, and household-level carbon budgets. Given the variability in U.S. climate zones, the sizable contributions of both upstream and downstream carbon sources, and the variety of electricity generation processes, a combination of policy measures seems warranted, in order to achieve recommended targets in a rapid, equitable, and relatively pain-free manner.
emissions were 8.1 billion tons, and the Kyoto Protocol would imply a cap of 6.4 billion tons by 2012 (EPA 2008) . Though the U.S. originally signed the Protocol, it withdrew in March 2001, shortly after George W. Bush became president.
In February of 2002 the Bush Administration announced goals for reducing CO2 e emissions under the Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiatives. These include cutting GHG emissions intensity (tons of CO2 e per dollar of GDP) by 18% over ten years (by 2012) and achieving emissions targets comparable to the Kyoto Protocol using market-based approaches. Since the plan focuses on reducing GHG intensity, total emissions could still increase. The U.S. Department of State (2007) has projected that by 2012, despite an estimated reduction in GHG intensity of 18.6%, total U.S. emissions will have increased by 11% (relative to 2002 levels), to 8.5 billion tons CO2 e .
In early 2007, President Bush announced his Twenty in Ten plan to reduce fuel use by 20% over ten years (White House 2007) . To achieve this goal, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 was passed, which includes increased production of biofuels, an increased national fuel economy standard of 35 miles per gallon (mpg) for light duty vehicles (LDV) sales by 2020, and tax incentives for those who wish to purchase hybrid vehicles (Sissine 2007 ).
In addition to some steps toward a federal policy, several U.S. states and cities have adopted aggressive policies to reduce GHG emissions (Martinez 2007 , MEPA 2007 , Clark 2007 . As 34 of the world's 75 largest GHG contributors, U.S. states and their policies could have a relatively large effect on the reduction of global emissions (Gallivan et al 2007) . According to the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, all 50 states have at least one policy aimed at reducing GHGs, and 18 have established targets for GHG reduction (Pew 2008) .
California has been the nation's climate change policy leader. In 2005, the California Energy Action Plan II established statewide GHG reduction targets (1990 levels by 2020, and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050), light-duty vehicle (LDV) emissions and fuel economy standards, and renewable electricity targets (CEC and CPUC 2005) . California's LDV standards were adopted by several other states and would have required a 30% GHG emission reduction in new vehicles, translating to 43 mpg fuel economy standard. However, in late December 2007, the U.S. EPA denied these states the right to set their own vehicle emission standards, claiming that the new national requirement of 35 mpg would be more effective than a "patchwork" of state policies (Broder and Barringer 2007) .
While 35 mpg is 40 percent higher than the nation's current LDV fleet average of 25 mpg, Europe's LDV fleet already enjoys a new-sales fuel economy of 44 mpg and Japan's sales average 48 mpg (An and Sauer 2004) . The U.S. has a long way to go, though recent gas price increases (EIA 2008) may propel buyers toward 35 mpg vehicles before 2020. If every U.S. household switched to driving only hybrid cars, like the Prius (but maintained present driving distances), a 1.1 billion-ton savings in CO2 emissions would be achieved. Similarly, if every household switched to solar-powered personal vehicles, a current savings of 2.0 billion tons could be achieved. Unfortunately, those sorts of shifts are hardly likely by 2020 (to meet California's target reduction of 2.1 billion tons). In addition, reduction targets will be increasingly more difficult to meet over time, as populations grow (since per-capita reduction needs rise). Of course, personal transport is only part of the problem; other sources are responsible for 81% of U.S. GHG emissions (of anthropogenic origin) (EPA 2006a) and 88% worldwide (Wadud et al. 2007 ). Reductions in other sectors, as well as behaviorally-based transport reductions, are clearly needed.
THE COST OF CARBON: TRAVELER RESPONSE TO PRICE CHANGES
While many feel that the costs of climate change far outweigh the full cost of any avoidance measures (e.g., Stern 2006 , Watters and Tight 2007 , Anable and Shaw 2007 , the marginal costs of GHG sequestration, avoidance, and removal vary widely, and the true cost of global warming is difficult to anticipate. Nevertheless, these will influence nations' emissions targets and thereby local and global carbon pricing. Presently, experts (e.g., Fischer et al. 2007 , EPA 2008a , CRAI 2008 , Nordhaus 2007 , Metcalf 2007 , and Parry and Small 2002 expect emissions removal and avoidance costs to vary between $10 and $80 per ton of CO2 e . This translates to just $0.13 to $1.04 per gallon of gasoline, quite a bit less than price shifts the nation has seen in recent years (see, e.g., EIA 2008 and .
As evident in recent U.S. experiences (Krauss, 2007) , higher fuel prices have meant relatively little in terms of Americans' travel patterns. As experts note (e.g., Van Dender, 2006 and Hughes et al., 2008) , fuel is a relatively small part of vehicle ownership and use costs, and not a significant portion of annual expenditures. For example, 15,000 miles of annual vehicle use at 20 miles/gallon and $3/gallon requires just $2,250, or 5 percent of the average U.S. household's income (Census 2007). Moreover, U.S. land use and transit provision patterns offer relatively few easy substitutes to driving one's car. Even a $1 increase in U.S. gas prices (implying a tax that is roughly twice what carbon trading prices are likely to be in the near term) raises this expenditure estimate to just $3,000/year. Recent fuel-price elasticity estimates suggest a $1 tax would result in near-and long-term per-capita VMT and gas-purchase reductions of just 1 to 10 percent (Hughes et al. 2008, Small and Van Dender 2006) . The level of gas tax increases needed to achieve California's 2020 GHG reduction targets in the travel sector (600 million ton CO2e reduction needed in U.S., using 2005 data [EPA 2008a] ) are on the order of $5 per gallon; these kinds of numbers may quickly demobilize already burdened low-income groups.
Most people make decisions in a progressive way, adopting low-impact, short-term strategies (e.g., car pooling and traveling during off-peak hours) before making more dramatic changes (job and home locations, hybrid vehicle purchases) (Cao and Mohktarian, 2005; Bomberg and Kockelman, 2007) . However, Small and Van Dender (2006) believe that "response to fuel prices has become increasingly dominated by changes in fuel efficiency rather than changes in travel". The car serves as a status symbol for drivers of all types, including hybrid owners (e.g., Maynard et al., 2007) . With personal vehicles so embedded in American culture and consumer attitudes controlling manufacturer's decisions, stricter CAFE regulations requiring more fuel efficient vehicles and environmentally oriented information campaigns may be much more effective than mode shift incentives. Moreover, given the relative (and rising) affluence of American households, taxes may not be as effective as (and may be much more harmful than) household level carbon budgets, as described below.
POLICY OPTIONS
Many policymakers tend to favor upstream policies, including taxes on producers and cap and trade of noxious outputs. But downstream regulation deserves a close look in the case of GHG emissions. Various issues emerge in all cases, and these are discussed here.
Upstream Policy Options
Taxation is commonly evaluated as a potential policy for impacting the demand of nearly any good. As such, it is rather well understood. Its main limitations lie in determining the proper tax rate (in order to hit a target GHG reduction, in this case) and putting revenues to their highest and best use. In some contrast, cap-and-trade schemes are a more innovative and complex solution that economists and policy makers are debating for GHG reductions. (EPA 2007c ) Under a simple grandfathering approach, energy providers within a region receive allowances based on past emissions, and then trade to match needs, producing a market for emissions that new producers can buy into (with some difficulty, based on market-determined prices). Such free allocations benefit existing producers − often in a perverse fashion (with less efficient producers enjoying more initial credits) − and can restrict competition, further reducing market efficiency. Auctioning is a more likely alternative, with bid prices determining producer allowances, with revenues going to the auctioneer. Several critical decisions emerge under both cap-and-trade mechanisms: identifying participants (e.g., power generators and fuel providers, distributors of imported products, third parties working to curb emissions via alternative investments [such as home design and forest cultivation, in the U.S. and abroad]), characterizing regulated activities (e.g., heating and cooling, public and private transport, agriculture), and defining the system for administering carbon use and transactions (e.g., centralized or distributed, governmental or privately managed). Such caps will effectively filter down as higher prices (effective taxes), and may be largely "ignored" by end users, in cases of low demand elasticity. If allowances are used (thus avoiding a great transfer of wealth from the private to the public sector), monetary benefits may accrue to relatively few entities (e.g., existing energy producers) and their shareholders. The ultimate effect of all these upstream policies could be highly regressive in nature. Nevertheless, opportunities do exist for a thoughtful distribution of revenues via income tax reductions and other income-transfer policies, to offset negative welfare effects while still preserving proper price incentives. These include various income tax reductions, increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit, and added food stamp benefits, as discussed in a recent Congressional Budget Office report (CBO 2008) .
Whether taxes or cap-and-trade are pursued, higher prices will filter through to final transactions. Of course, fuel taxes already exist at the gas pump, and can be raised to reflect carbon contributions (by recognizing that 25 lbs of CO2e are released per gallon of standard gasoline, from well to wheel, on average [EPA 2007b] ). Fees could be added to airline ticket prices (based on expected aircraft fuel consumption per passenger) and utility bills (based on feedstock contributions to CO2). In theory, if one charges a tax equal to the marginal, external cost of the produced GHG, well-functioning markets should equilibrate to a social-welfare-maximizing state of (carbon) use and production (Varian, 1992; Pigou, 1954) . Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to quantify the cost of global warming, and producers and consumers do not have perfect information, nor do they precisely maximize profits and personal utility/welfare. Moreover, related market imperfections do exist, and may impact such behaviors 2 . And incomes are so high in developed countries that many households may be able to avoid behavioral changes. (Fleming 2006) Unfortunately, the level of tax needed to rein in consumption by wealthier households could devastate those of lower income.
The Case for Downstream Credits
Another approach is distribution of emissions credits to end-consumers, while auditing their consumption of energy. This approach would make GHG targets, allowances and trading far more obvious to individual consumers, while addressing various equity issues inherent in alternative policies. Raux and Marlot (2005) hypothesized that such a system could be seen as an alternative to yet another tax, and thus more acceptable to the public. Moreover, since it would apply at the level of individuals (not just businesses), it may receive solid private sector support. Of course, the direct distribution of credits to end consumers addresses equity issues directly. However, the administrative burden of quantifying, tracking and reporting (and then trading) individual or household-level GHG consumption can be significant. In effect, carbon credits would represent a new, required form of currency .
Recognizing practical limitations, such quantification and reporting would not apply to many forms of consumption (e.g., not to clothing and food); instead, it probably would emphasize home utility bills, registered-vehicle travel (via odometer readings), and air travel (via airline reporting requirements).
3 While residential energy needs and personal travel are key sources (totaling 36%) of GHG emissions, some upstream forms of regulation would still be required to hit desired targets. Nevertheless, behavioral response to downstream carbon targets is likely to be swift, more equitable, and potentially far less painful for consumers than upstream taxation (via direct taxes or cap-and-trade policies). (See, e.g., Anable and Shaw, 2007.) There is very little research to date on the idea of consumer-level GHG emissions credits. Recently, Watters and Tight (2007) examined such opportunities and concluded that the most effective way to achieve target reductions is to combine upstream and downstream methods. They recommend upstream carbon rationing with downstream allocations, and prohibiting individuals from trading with organizations. Implementation and monitoring costs are key issues, but Watters and Tight (2007) believe that the system could be put into place within five to ten years. Interestingly, Northrop and Sassoon (2007) expect an upstream system of cap and trade policies to capture only 40 to 50% of U.S. carbon production, so approaching the policy from both ends (producers and consumers) seems wise. Recent EU research suggests that such upstream-downstream scheme combinations are feasible, and many agree that the costs of climate change far outweigh the full cost of any avoidance measures (e.g., Stern 2006 , Watters and Tight 2007 , Anable and Shaw 2007 .
In general, it is difficult to quantify which policy option(s) will be most effective, implementable, and acceptable. But a combination of methods appears to hold much merit. Of course, demand elasticities for gasoline appear quite low in the U.S., particularly in the near term; but our GHG emissions come from far more than the transport sector. Given the preference our decentralized systems of untethered automobile use and the energy density of petroleum, deep cuts in energy consumption may be most readily made in other forms of production and consumption, including power generation practices, food purchase decisions, home size, home design and temperature settings. The following sections describe the many elements of one's carbon "footprint", and suggest where sizable cuts in average American consumption patterns can be made, to try and achieve California targets at the level of individuals, as though under a downstream policy of carbon credits.
THE SOURCES OF OUR CARBON FOOTPRINTS
Energy is a key component of our existence. From the production and transport of foods we eat and clothes we wear, to construction and maintenance of the buildings we inhabit and propulsion of the vehicles we occupy, energy is fundamental. It is important to understand the relative and absolute contributions of our different choices.
U.S. CO2 e emissions per capita (average carbon footprint) were 27 tons in 2006, or 30% above CA's 2020 target (EPA 2008) . These emissions come from various end-use sectors, including transport (28%), industry (29%), residential (17%), commercial (17%), and agricultural users (8%) (EPA 2008) . When electricity generation is counted separately from each end use, carbon emissions emerge in the following proportions: 34% from electricity generation, 28% from transport, 19% from industry, 8% from agriculture, 6% from commercial uses, and 5% residential uses (EPA 2008) . Personal transport accounts for 19% of total GHG emissions, or 68% of transport sector emissions, and household electricity consumption accounts for 12% of the total. Together, transport and electricity generation are responsible for 62% of total emissions. Policies to reduce CO2 emissions may do best to emphasize these sectors.
Improvements can be made in both supply and demand. In the transport context, for example, more fuel-efficient vehicles can be produced, public transportation could be improved, and neighborhoods can be made more pedestrian friendly and offer more local shopping. On the demand side, of course, people have to be willing to buy such cars and/or reduce their driving. Similarly, improvements could be made in electricity generation (e.g., through new windmill technologies, nuclear power investments, and carbon capture and sequestration [see, e.g., Kockelman et al. 2008] ) and energy use by various products (like computers, water heating, lighting, and air-conditioning units). Of course, certain investments and design improvements can cause a household's energy expenditures to fall, encouraging a slight "rebound" in electricity use. As with gasoline, the demand for electricity has been found to be relatively inelastic (-0.2 in the short run and -0.32 in the longer run at -0.32 [Bernstein 2006]) , and the rebound effect is also marginal. (Small and Van Dender [2006] recently estimated this to be just 10 percent, in the case of gasoline.)
Reductions Needed
The State of California is requiring that GHG emissions be reduced to 1990 emissions levels by year 2020, and 80% below 1990 levels by This 380 lbs per-month per-person target is an important one to keep in mind, as we quantify the benefits of behavioral changes on the part of household (including the design of their homes and vehicles). How easy is it for American households to meet such a target? Success or failure may determine the fate of carbon reductions policies worldwide, along with the future of countless regions and their inhabitants.
GHG Emissions from Transport
The question becomes: How can we best achieve such reductions? Tallying carbon emissions in the transport sector is reasonably straightforward. Vehicle fuel is the main source of such GHG emissions, and is measured through gasoline (and diesel) sales. However, each gallon of gasoline entails wasted crude oil, refining, and transport, raising the final CO2 e tally by roughly 25 percent (to 25 lbs of CO2 e per gallon of gasoline, or roughly 1 pound of CO2 per mile driven) (EPA 2006b). Moreover, the energy embodied in a vehicle's production contributes roughly 10 to 15% of a vehicle's lifetime carbon emissions (Carnegie Mellon University, 1998). Maintaining (and using) one's vehicle longer (or ensuring others use it for a long time) may be quite helpful in reducing one's long-term contributions.
Emissions were calculated for various vehicle types and a range of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) per month, as seen in Table 1 . The average VMT per month (per U.S. passenger vehicle) is just over 1,100 (NHTS 2001) , and the average U.S. vehicle's fuel economy is 20.2 mpg (EPA 2006b), making for a rough CO2 emissions average of 1,360 pounds per month per vehicle. A household could save a few hundred pounds of CO2 emissions per month by switching from an SUV to a CUV hybrid or switching from a large/mid-sized car to a mid-sized hybrid. This may meet the 2020 target for a household's personal transport GHG emissions reductions (of 200 lbs/month/person). To meet 2050 targets (of 750 lb/month/person from transport), additional savings could come from reducing monthly VMT by 200 to 300 miles (or 6 to 10 miles/day), switching to a plug-in hybrid vehicle (soon to be available, according to Maynard 2008) , or combining a vehicle switch with a switch to advanced biofuels (such as cellulosic ethanol 5 ).
Air travel, another source of personal-travel emissions, was responsible for 9% of all U.S. transportation GHG emissions in 2003, with commercial air travel contributing 72% of that share (EPA 2006a). While air travel presently tends to be more efficient than driving solo (FAA 2005) , actual numbers depend on aircraft occupancy, trip length, and vehicle fuel economy (which varies greatly by make and model). The average aircraft emissions intensity is 0.79 lbs CO2e per passenger-mile (pax-mi) (FAA 2005) 6 , while the average American car (at 20 mpg) emits 1.3 lbs/pax-mi when driven solo. However, as car occupancy increases, the automobile can become more efficient than flying, per passenger mile (e.g., 0.3 lbs/pax-mi with four passengers, or less for more fuel efficient autos).
Public transportation can also serve as a more efficient automobile alternative, given the right setting. Rail (heavy rail, light rail, commuter rail) is roughly 3 times more efficient than the average automobile trip (at 1.6 occupancy [NHTS 2001, Davis and Diegel 2007] ). Buses, however, are not as efficient. With average bus ridership at 9 passengers per vehicle (Davis and Diegel 2007) , the average automobile trip is less emitting than a bus ride of the same length. However, when considering a slightly higher bus occupancy of 11 passengers per vehicle, the two are equivalent, in terms of CO2 emissions. Along routes with relatively high ridership or routes utilizing alternatively fueled buses (e.g., hybrids), taking the bus instead of driving is a good way to reduce household travel emissions. This is particularly true if the car trip would have been by a single occupant. And, of course, if bus services are not being added as demand increases, there is little energy cost to adding new riders. In this way the marginal emissions rate of transit may be nearly zero (per added passenger-mile). Moreover, bus trips tend to be shorter than car trips; thus, to the extent travelers who shift modes also shorten their trip distances (and/or end up walking and biking more, in concert with their transit trips), savings can be had.
In fact, biking is the most efficient mode (Ulrich 2006) and, like the car, is "on demand". Ondemand travel is a very attractive feature to the hundreds of millions of American who live and work in neighborhoods with relative limited transit frequency to desired destinations. A combination of bike and transit may serve the needs of many, by providing a backup mode in case of poor weather, a missed bus, imperfect transit routings, and so on.
GHG Emissions from Residential Uses
In addition to transport and various forms of embodied energy, most households use electricity continuously, to power a variety of appliances and other items. Monthly GHG savings from various appliance upgrades and usage shifts are shown in Table 4 . While switching to low wattage light bulbs will certainly help households reduce CO2 e emissions, shifts in heating, cooling, home design and other choices enjoy a much greater savings potential (see Figure 1) . "Phantom loads" are energy consumed by electrical devices when they are not in direct use but still plugged in, and these are estimated to account for 6% of household electricity consumption. The US Department of Energy estimates that the average US household consumes 450 kWh per year on appliances that are turned off (DOE 2001) . Plugging appliances (even clothing washers and dryers) into power strips and turning off the power strip when not in use could result in a 2,000-pound (1 ton) CO2e reduction each year, per household. Such GHG emissions estimates depend, of course, on the household's electricity grid's energy sources.
Total home cooling loads (Table 2) However, if the home is well shaded, one can purchase a unit with a capacity of only 30,000 BTU/hr. This is equivalent to downsizing the home to a range of 1,500-2,000 square feet. Additionally, buying a new A/C unit could reduce energy demands by a quarter, and thus result in varying degrees of CO2 emissions reductions. The highest cooling loads are in Climate Zone 5 (Miami, Austin, Atlanta, and Las Vegas). In this region, such simple changes can have significant energy savings. Reducing the time that an A/C is operating during peak summer months by just one hour per day can significantly impact national CO2 emissions, in the range of 600-1,000 lbs per household per year.
Average home size in the U.S. is approximately 2400 square feet, and new-home sizes have been rising at a rate of roughly 30 SF per year over the past decade (NAHB 2007) 7 . For a singlefamily dwelling unit (SFDU), the total CO2 emissions per square foot per year is approximately 7.90 pounds for electricity and natural gas combined. For multi-family dwelling unit (MFDU), the average is 5.33 pounds CO2e per square foot per year, all else equal 8 . While home size is important, home design appears to be more important in the energy debate. Insulation thickness is considered the single most effective way to reduce a home's energy demands; and, as insulation gets thicker, home down-sizing emissions benefits fall. (Essentially, as the building envelope becomes more efficient, size is less important.) RECS regressions for non-residential buildings suggest that updating a building's insulation 9 may save 2 to 4 kWh/sq ft per year in electricity and 9 MBTU/sqft/year of natural gas. This is a combined savings of about 14 lbs CO2e per square foot per year. For a 2,400 square foot home, this is 33,600 pounds of CO2e per year, or 2,800 pounds per month on average.
Shared walls reduce heating and cooling needs of individual units. Overall, Table 3 regression results suggest that CO2e savings in moving from a 2400 sf SFDU to a 2000 MFDU yields an annual savings of 6,846 pounds of CO2e per unit. If 1% of US households were to make such a move, the aggregate savings is estimated to be 4.3 million tons, or 0.055% of current U.S. emissions. Regression results also suggest that each added unit in an apartment building should result in a 55 lb savings of CO2e per year (per unit), after accounting for both added floors and added units. For example, households in a 5-story, 10-unit building are predicted to have energy demands that produce 328 pounds less CO2 each year than households in a 2-story, 4-unit apartment building, all else equal.
Related to all this, the U.S. share of MFDUs has been rising over the past few years to roughly 40 percent of all residential units built per year, while the share of SFDUs has fallen to roughly 55 percent, as shown in Appendix Figure C1 . There may be opportunities to shift these shares much further, and increase the lifetime of MFDUs, through higher-quality construction practices.
To summarize: in the short term, substantial energy savings can be realized by adding wall and roof insulation to one's home or upgrading the air conditioning unit, especially in sunny, hot climates. Longer term savings can be achieved via downsizing and/or sharing walls, particularly via a move towards multi-unit building types. Finally, just as heating becomes more efficient as one downsizes and/or introduces shared walls, cooling load calculations yield similar results. While these calculations do not account for solar convection and radiance, heat gained through windows (a form of solar radiance) can be important in cooling load calculations, and ideally would be included in such calculations.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
California's emissions reduction targets are 1990 levels by 2020, and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Many U.S. states and cities are taking these targets, and the issue of climate change, very seriously. This paper highlights a variety of reasonable carbon-reducing behaviors. If these and other potential behavioral adjustments can be illuminated for household members, encouraging meaningful near-and long-term behavioral changes, the planet's quest for GHG emissions reductions should be attainable.
For U.S. households, these targets translate to an estimated reduction of 380 lbs of CO2e per month per person by 2020, and 1400 lbs by 2050. As evident from values provided in Table 4 , a CO2 emissions reduction goal of 380 lbs per month per person could be accomplished rather readily by reducing household VMT, using a more fuel-efficient vehicle, making housing unit modifications, adopting several electricity savings suggestions, or some combination of these tactics. . For example, in the short term, if the average U.S. household reduces monthly VMT by 100 miles and reduces water heater temperature to 120 degrees Fahrenheit, it can meet CA's Reaching total 2020 and 2050 targets (not just household targets), however, will require involvement from the commercial and industrial sectors. Electrification of the vehicle fleet (via plug-in hybrids for freeway commuters), greater use of renewables (as power plant feedstocks), carbon capture and sequestration (when burning coal at power plants), smaller vehicles and homes, shared and better insulated walls, appliance upgrades, mode shifts and other behaviors are likely needed ).
Appropriate policies for triggering such response across the U.S. population are less obvious. Certainly, higher CAFÉ standards are needed (e.g., 40 mpg across all new light-duty vehicles by 2020), to ensure that the vehicle fleet heads down a path of greater efficiency. But the most important determinant of whether the U.S. and other countries can comply with emissions targets probably is end-consumer behavior. Regulations on product design, imposition of carbon budgets (with trading), and higher prices (via upstream taxes, road tolls, vehicle feebate policies, and the like) all impact choices − of dwellings, vehicles (and its occupancy), destinations, modes, fuels, foods, and other goods and services. How can we motivate change in the best directions, enhancing the health and welfare of a nation's populace while protecting the planet?
While upstream regulation of energy providers offers simpler implementation opportunities than capping emissions across final consumers, its ultimate effectiveness appears questionable when considering elasticities of demand for energy, particularly in a country as affluent as the U.S. Downstream cap-and-trade schemes require more active regulation but are arguably able to ensure more dramatic behavioral change while addressing equity implications and tax-revenue distribution issues head-on. As Watters and Tight (2007) have suggested, a combination of such policies may tap the great majority of energy users while allowing communities to more readily meet emissions targets. Individuals' formal recognition of a nation's carbon targets, via some form of personal targets, seems an appropriate policy perspective to pursue, helping ensure that consumers − not just producers − make good near-and long-term decisions. Figure 1 . Household Electricity Consumption 
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